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I. Introduction 
 
The extent to which investment performance is rigorously scrutinized is even more significant 
today than ever before.  The significant attention provided fund performance has primarily arisen 
due to the substantial size of assets delegated to professional money managers, as well as the 
continued debate between the merits of active versus passive fund management.1  In terms of the 
degree of scrutiny applied to tests of active management, recent literature has documented 
inconsistent evidence with the efficient markets hypothesis, where some value-added is 
achievable and therefore consistent with the Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) informational equilibrium 
(e.g. Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Wermers (2000), Daniel et al. (1997), Chen et al. (2000), 
Pinnuck (2003), Gallagher and Looi (2005)).  In particular, Wermers (2000) has contributed 
significantly to this literature by re-opening the debate about the value of active management, 
where he utilizes a database of security holdings for U.S. mutual funds.  He finds evidence that 
stocks held by fund managers outperform characteristic-based benchmarks by 1.3 percent per 
annum on a gross basis (and underperform by -1 percent on a net basis).  Wermers’ findings 
suggest that on average, active managers exhibit some degree of stock picking skill to cover their 
expenses.   
 
In light of Wermers’ (2000) recent evidence supporting the value of active management, 
subsequent studies have also utilized higher frequency data on equity holdings as a means of 
better quantifying the stock selection ability of managers from aggregate trading data.  This finer 
decomposition of performance measurement has arisen through the use of snapshots of portfolio 
                                                 
1 According to statistics as at September 2003, $A193 billion in assets are delegated to investment managers by 
institutional investors, representing 35 percent of all superannuation fund assets. Even more surprising is the 
significant growth rate in pension fund assets, which have more than doubled since June 1996. The substantial 
growth in assets managed by investment firms in Australia has been primarily due to compulsory employer 
sponsored superannuation contributions. The Superannuation Guarantee Levy is equivalent to nine percent of an 
employer’s gross salary. 
 3
holdings at quarter-end.2  While an active manager’s stock picking ability can be quantified in 
terms of the purchase and sale activities executed, aggregate portfolio return also relies on a 
second important component of portfolio management – portfolio construction.  Interestingly, 
prior research examining both the stockholdings and portfolio allocations to individual securities 
is limited.  Accordingly, our study provides an important contribution to the measurement of 
active performance using a unique database of monthly portfolio holdings that also includes 
equities, cash, and derivative securities held by fund managers.  While Blake et al. (1999), 
Brinson et al. (1986, 1991) and Chen et al. (2000) identify portfolio design as a significant 
determinant of total return variation, the literature has only rigorously examined one important 
phase of the investment process, namely stock picking ability.  Accordingly, the purpose of this 
study is to examine an important attribute of portfolio management by quantifying the role of 
portfolio concentration in active return generation.  Portfolio concentration measures the extent 
to which the portfolio weights held in stocks, industries and sectors deviate from the underlying 
index or market portfolio.3 
 
Given that active portfolio management requires that fund managers constrain their tracking 
error volatility through the implementation of a diversified portfolio, the manager therefore faces 
a trade-off decision between managing the beta risk of the fund, while at the same time 
implementing strategies designed to capture outperformance relative to the market.  While 
portfolio concentration is defined as deviations of stock weights from the market portfolio, the 
measure might also be extended to include deviations relative to the risk attributes of the 
underlying market portfolio.  In terms of beta risk, active managers construct and manage 
                                                 
2 Interestingly, Wermers’ (2000) database of portfolio holdings only accounts for stock holdings, and does not 
include fund exposures to bonds, cash or derivative instruments.  Wermers identifies that for the universe of funds 
irrespective of investment objective, between 79.9 and 85.4 percent of fund assets were held in equities (See Table 
1, p.1664).  For an excellent discussion of the Wermers’ (2000) study, see Moskowitz (2000). 
3 Fund performance is achieved with respect to two interactive decisions – stock selection and portfolio 
construction.  The former represents the ability of active investment managers to identify and exploit mispriced 
stocks, and the latter accounts for the portfolio manager’s ability to correctly weight the stocks in the portfolio in 
such a manner which attempts to outperform the market.   
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portfolios within a mean-variance framework, where portfolio optimization techniques attempt to 
constrain a fund’s tracking error volatility in accordance with the fund’s objectives.4  Therefore, 
an analysis of portfolio weights relative to the market portfolio represents an important 
component of a fund’s design, and has implications for tracking error risk and performance. 
 
While fund managers are concerned about the need to implement appropriate risk management 
practices in managing a portfolio’s tracking error, increasing the concentration of the portfolio 
(i.e. in stocks, industries or sectors) is designed to enhance the fund’s performance relative to the 
market.  Active portfolio tilts (or bets) reflect a manager’s private information set, and the 
magnitude by which the portfolio deviates from the market index weight is an important 
determinant of the active fund’s total return, and therefore the degree of managerial skill.  If 
active managers hold valuable information, an analysis of portfolio concentration represents a 
direct test of the value of active management.  Accordingly, if skilful managers exhibit 
capabilities not only in identifying mispriced stocks, but also in managing the portfolio’s stock 
allocation, then superior ability (i.e. performance) should be directly related to a portfolio’s 
concentration.  
 
Empirical evidence concerning the relationship between portfolio concentration and performance 
is sparse.  Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005) are the first to provide rigorous examination to 
whether industry concentration for U.S. mutual funds is related to performance, and find that 
those funds with a high degree of industry concentration perform better than funds which hold 
more stocks across many different industries.  Kacperczyk et al.’s (2005) results are consistent 
with the theory that some funds possess superior investment ability.  Their research is also 
supported by Wermers (2003), who evaluates the relationship between active fund returns and 
                                                 
4 Return covariances and variances are critical inputs to the optimisation process. Moskowitz (2003) documents the 
relationship of stock size and to a lesser extent book-to-market value of equity to portfolio covariance risk, and 
Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (1999) find evidence that market, size, and book-to-market value of equity capture 
the general structure of these return covariances. 
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tracking errors for a sample of U.S. mutual funds.  Wermers finds a positive relationship 
between risk (volatility) and performance, confirming that the cross-sectional variation in fund 
returns is explained by successful managers taking larger portfolio bets.  While the magnitude of 
bets taken by fund managers is an important issue in terms of portfolio concentration and 
performance, our study also considers the direction of the bet (i.e. under-or-overweight) and the 
importance of stock size in the allocation decision (given the risk control considerations of active 
managers).  Our study also contributes to the literature by examining how differences in fund 
size and manager characteristics (e.g. style, organizational structure, benchmark index) explain 
the degree of portfolio concentration of active Australian equity funds.   
 
Our research provides an important contribution to the performance evaluation literature in a 
number of other respects.  First, we employ a more frequent interval relating to the portfolio 
holdings of active equity funds (i.e. monthly versus quarterly), providing a more precise 
estimation of the concentration and performance relationship.  Furthermore, the data in this study 
also accounts for a fund’s holdings of exchange-traded options, which ensures a more accurate 
determination of aggregate stock exposures.  While Kacperczyk et al. (2005) argue that industry 
allocations in portfolio management are important, their study also relies on the assumption that 
the aggregated industry classifications capture differences in risk dimensions.  Their study also 
relies on self-calculated industry classifications that are not directly observable by fund 
managers.5  In comparison, this study employs 24 directly observable industry classifications 
within the Australian equity market.  The Australian case is also interesting, relative to the U.S. 
market, in the sense that both the investment industry is highly concentrated, as well as the 
benchmark index being dominated by a small number of relatively large stocks.6   
                                                 
5 The Kacperczyk et al. (2005) framework aggregates 48 individual sectors in 10 groups based on non-quantifiable 
relationships.  However, fund managers may not necessarily manage their portfolios to such aggregate industry 
classifications. 
6For example, the largest 10 managers account for approximately 60 percent of aggregate assets, and the largest 20 
stocks listed on the ASX exceeds 62 percent of the market capitalization weights of the S&P/ASX 300 Index. In 
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We find a positive and significant relationship between performance and portfolio concentration 
for our sample of active equity funds.  This relationship is stronger for those stocks in which 
active funds hold overweight positions, as well as for stocks which fall outside the largest 50 
stocks listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) by market capitalisation.  More 
concentrated funds tend to be those with relatively smaller assets under management, who 
experience fund outflows in the previous quarter, implement growth investment styles, 
benchmarked to a narrower index than the S&P/ASX 300, and being institutions that are not 
affiliated with a bank or life-office firm.  
 
This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and is followed by a description of 
the portfolio design attributes of the active managers in our sample. Section 3 examines the 
relationship between investment performance and portfolio concentration, followed by an 
investigation of whether portfolio concentration is explained by specific fund manager 
characteristics.  The final section concludes the study and makes suggestions for future research. 
 
II. Data 
This study examines the relationship between portfolio concentration and investment 
performance for a sample of 37 actively managed institutional equity funds in the period 1 
January 1995 to 31 December 2001.  The portfolio holdings data is sourced from the Portfolio 
Analytics Database and contains all assets held by the fund, including stock holdings, options 
securities, futures contracts and the cash balance.  The database reports holdings at a monthly 
frequency and fund returns are measured on a before expenses and pre-tax basis.7  
                                                                                                                                                             
comparison to the U.S., the ratio of average manager size to average stock size translates into Australian managers 
being estimated at between 5-10 times larger per stock. 
7 The manager holdings data was collected from all participating institutions at a common time period and as a result 
a degree of survivorship bias is present. However, after comparing the performance of the funds in the Portfolio 
Analytics Database to the performance of the survivorship free population of funds in the Mercer Investment 
Consulting Manager Performance Analytics (MPA) database, it appears that this bias is limited. The performance of 
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The investment managers were each requested to provide information for up to two of their 
largest institutionally operated active Australian equity fund (i.e. a pooled investment vehicle 
such as a ‘unit trust’).  The definition of ‘active’ fund was explicitly defined as funds exhibiting 
a target ex-ante tracking error greater than 100 basis points per annum.  The term ‘largest’ was 
defined as the marked-to-market valuation of assets under management at the end of the sample 
period.  The largest fund was deemed appropriate as being representative of the investment 
process executed by the investment firm in the management of domestic equity assets.   
 
Given that the database was compiled at a single point in time, was voluntary, and that 
participation of the managers required contributing a substantial amount of effort in aggregating 
the information, the data collection procedure adopted was determined as the best means 
available in maximising participation.  The collection procedure was also justified given a 
number of other considerations.  First, and most importantly, the number of pooled products 
publicly available to institutional investors is small.  Indeed, most managers offer only one or 
two unit trust vehicles across each asset class for institutional investors.  By requesting the two 
largest funds, the study ensures that fund managers are not able to selectively determine which 
fund data was supplied.  Second, the organizational operation of Australian equity funds is 
typically executed by a team of investment specialists, under the direction of the Head of 
Equities, and the team includes a number of individual portfolio managers and analysts.  The 
team approach adopted by investment managers within a single investment style ensures that all 
money invested in that asset class (including private accounts) is managed in a consistent 
manner. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
the funds in the MPA database is very similar to that of the Portfolio Analytics Database funds and indicates our 
sample is representative of the population. 
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the institutional active funds in the sample.  Over the 
seven-year period there are on average of 22.9 funds at any point in time. The average fund size 
is $A313.50 million, however this statistic is skewed.  Ranked by funds under management, the 
sample comprises five of the largest 10 Australian fund managers across the population, four 
ranked 11-20, five ranked 21-30 and 16 outside the largest 30 managers.  The average length of 
data provided by the managers is approximately four and a half years; however fund length and 
age are not identical, given that the managers supplied data historically as far back as their 
archival systems permitted.  Annualised portfolio turnover is on average 0.767 times total fund 
assets.  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 1>> 
 
A significant advantage over U.S. studies that employ portfolio holdings is the availability of 
holdings information pertaining to securities other than ordinary shares. The Portfolio Analytics 
Database includes stock holdings, options securities, futures contracts, cash positions and 
miscellaneous securities (e.g. warrants, convertibles, etc.).  Their inclusion in the determination 
of total fund holdings gives rise to a more accurate reflection of the portfolio’s total exposure to 
any given stock.8 
 
Fund manager characteristics data is also examined in this study, and is sourced from the 
Portfolio Analytics Database, IFSA Questionnaires and other publicly available sources.  The 
study also merges stock price information which is sourced from the ASX Stock Exchange 
Automated Trading System (SEATS), which was provided by SIRCA.  The SEATS data 
includes all trade information for stocks listed on the ASX. Our data also includes the ASX and 
S&P/ASX benchmark index weights for constituent stocks of the ASX All Ordinaries 
                                                 
8 Options are accounted for by determining the equivalent number of ordinary shares (using the option’s delta) and 
adding this to the manager’s stock holding. This procedure was first employed by Pinnuck (2003). 
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Accumulation Index (pre April 2000) and the S&P/ASX 100, 200 and 300 Accumulation Indices 
(post April 2000).  In our sample, two managers are benchmarked to S&P/ASX 100, six to the 
S&P/ASX 200 and 28 the S&P/ASX 300.  Our study employs a monthly Treasury bill 
instrument as the proxy for the risk-free rate, obtained from the Reserve Bank of Australia 
website. 
 
III. Portfolio Design 
 
Examination of the performance of active manager portfolios begins with a detailed examination 
of the portfolio’s configuration.  Table 2 provides descriptive statistics relating to the portfolio 
design of funds in the period January 1995 and December 2001. Results in Panel A of Table 2 
indicate that on average, active managers hold between 50 and 60 stocks in their portfolios, 
whereas the median is slightly lower than the mean (ranging between 43 and 54 stocks).  In 
contrast, Kacperczyk et al. (2005) document mean portfolio holdings of 91.42 stocks for U.S. 
equity mutual funds, and a median of 63 securities.  However, this difference in stock holdings 
between Australian and U.S. managers reflects differences in (1) the universe of stocks available 
to managers and (2) the composition of market indices.  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 2>> 
 
The degree of concentration present in an investment manager’s portfolio is examined in terms 
of the magnitude of bets (i.e. underweight and overweight) taken relative to the underlying 
benchmark index.  A substantial ‘bet’ taken for a particular security indicates the manager’s 
future expectations pertaining to the performance of the security.  Given that active managers are 
also concerned with tracking error volatility, it is imperative that appropriate risk controls are 
implemented such that the portfolio’s risk-return objective is not compromised.  Table 2 shows 
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the extent to which the aggregate manager moves their portfolio’s constituents away from the 
benchmark index.  
 
Table 2 (Panels B and C) also reports the number of times over-and-under index weight the fund 
managers are prepared to move their portfolios from the market portfolio.  The stock level bets 
taken by active funds range between 4.73 and 7.03 times index weight.  Furthermore, the results 
show active fund managers take overweight portfolio positions in stocks up to 22 times the 
benchmark.  In comparison, a manager with a negative outlook on a security is likely to refrain 
from including the stock in the portfolio.  Thus the extent to which a manager allocates an 
underweight position within their portfolio holdings is on average substantially lower than for 
overweight holdings.  Panels D and E of Table 2 also show the average number of overweight 
and underweight exposures held by the funds in our sample.  The average number of 
underweight positions ranges between 7 and 11, compared with 37 and 40 for overweight 
positions.  This asymmetry is expected, given that managers would be expected to hold a greater 
proportion of stocks they believe will outperform the benchmark, and therefore, the portfolio will 
be overweight in such stocks relative to the underlying index.  On the other hand, underweight 
portfolio holdings may arise either due to the manager gradually acquiring or liquidating the 
security, for tracking error management reasons or given trading cost considerations. 
 
IV. The Relationship Between Portfolio Concentration and Investment Performance 
 
The previous section revealed that active managers are prepared to take significant overweight 
positions in securities on the basis of information, however, the extent to which superior (or 
inferior) performance is explained by portfolio deviations from the market index remains an 
empirical issue.  Consequently, this section examines the relationship between portfolio 
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performance and the degree of concentration exhibited by the fund.  Concentration is examined 
at the stock level, industry level and on a sector basis. 
 
A. Concentration Measure 
 
Portfolio concentration (referring to the extent to which the fund portfolio deviates from the 
market portfolio) can be measured using a Divergence Index at either a stock, industry or sector 
level.  This metric was first developed and implemented by Kacperczyk et al. (2005) as an 
industry concentration measure.  The Divergence Index at time t for fund F is defined in 
equation (1) and is the sum of the squared differences of the weights for N securities in the 
portfolio (wi,tF), relative to the weights of the securities in the underlying benchmark (wi,tm).  
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In addition to quantifying the divergence of a portfolio on the basis of individual stock holdings, 
we also examine the portfolio’s deviation from the benchmark with respect to holdings at both 
the industry and sector levels.  Standard and Poor’s and the ASX classify securities on the basis 
of 24 industries and 9 sectors (see Appendix 1).  These classifications provide additional tests of 
the performance-concentration relationship, given that fund managers may also deviate their 
fund holdings from the index on the basis of aggregate stock characteristics (which are defined 
by industries and sectors).  These classifications are performed in an effort to improve the 
manner in which the level of concentration of a portfolio is measured.9  
 
                                                 
9 For example, a fund with an overweight position in one of the four major financial institutions would at the stock 
level potentially have a greater Divergence Index than for a fund which holds a slightly lower overweight position in 
all four of the major financial institutions.  However, this latter manager is taking a significant bet on banks at an 
aggregate level, indicating a positive outlook on the industry. Classifying stocks into industries and sectors looks at 
concentration from this perspective, and takes into account the strength of bets taken at each of these levels. 
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Alternative measures of portfolio concentration are the Entropy and Herfindahl Indexes.  The 
former is defined as the sum of the weight in each of securities multiplied by the natural log of 
its weight, and the latter the sum of the squared weights for each of the securities in the portfolio.  
However, results for these measures are not considered given the findings of Kacperczyk et al. 
(2005), which show these approaches are highly correlated, with the Divergence Index yielding 
similar results.  Furthermore, given that we are interested in the strength (or magnitude) of bets 
taken against the benchmark, a measure that is relative to the underlying benchmark (i.e. the 
Divergence Index) is a more intuitive measure. 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the Divergence Index over the entire sample period for all 
active funds.  The distribution is skewed to the right across stock, industry and sector 
classifications, and there exists substantial cross-sectional variation in the Divergence Index 
levels.  However this variation becomes less pronounced as the analysis moves from the stock 
level to the sector level. 
 
<<INSERT FIGURE 1>> 
 
B. Performance Measures 
The relationship between performance and portfolio concentration is examined for each of a 
series of performance measures, namely fund excess returns to the market index, one and four 
factor alphas, and the appraisal ratio.10  
 
The 1-factor alpha reported in equation (2) is a risk-adjusted performance measure that controls 
for a single market factor, estimated using an OLS regression with monthly returns.  The four 
factor model of Carhart (1997) (see equation (3)) employs an additional three factors to the 
single index model, namely size, book-to-market and momentum.  The inclusion of the size and 
                                                 
10 The excess return of fund i at time t is the difference between the monthly raw return of the fund and that of the 
fund specific benchmark, which is one of either the S&P/ASX 300, S&P/ASX 200, or S&P/ASX 100 Accumulation 
Indices. 
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book-to-market factors originates from the seminal work of Fama and French (1993), while the 
one-year momentum anomaly identified by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) represents a control of 
price momentum strategies documented in securities markets.  
 
ittiiit RMRFR εβα ++= 1                  (2) 
 
ittPRitHMLitSMBitiiit YRPRHMLSMBRMRFR εββββα +++++= 14                        (3)
  
 where: 
 Rit   = The excess return of fund i in period t (where excess return is equal to 
fund return less the risk-free rate); 
RMRFt   =  The excess return of the market portfolio in period t;  
 αi  = The risk-adjusted excess return (alpha) of fund i using either the one factor 
or four factor model; 
βi   = The systematic (beta) risk of fund i;   
SMB    = The size factor measured as the difference between an equally weighted 
return of firms comprising the top and the bottom quintile of stocks 
(ranked by market capitalisation); 
HML   = The HML factor is the difference between an equally weighted return of 
firms comprising the top and the bottom quintile of stocks (ranked by 
book-to-market ratio); 
PR1YR =  The momentum factor is the difference between an equally weighted 
return of firms comprising the S&P/ASX 300 Accumulation Index with 
the highest quartile annual return (lagged one month) and the lowest 
quartile yearly return (lagged one month); 
εit  = Random error term of fund i in period t. 
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In order to capture the impact of idiosyncratic (diversifiable) risk, the appraisal ratio is included 
as an additional performance measure.  This metric reflects the tendency of a portfolio to deviate 
significantly from the market portfolio, and to incur higher levels of unsystematic risk.  The 
appraisal ratio (see equation (4)), is a modified version of that specified by Treynor and Black 
(1973) and Kacperczyk et al. (2005).  The former employ the CAPM alpha in the numerator, and 
the latter the 3-factor alpha of Fama and French.  The appraisal ratio appearing in this analysis 
features the 4-factor alpha as previously defined.  It is theoretically evident that investors have a 
preference for higher appraisal ratios.  
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where: 
ia′   = The four factor risk-adjusted return (alpha) for fund i in period t; 
ieo ,′  = The residual standard error for fund i in period t. 
 
C. Regression Analysis  
 
This section employs a multivariate regression model as a means of examining the relationship 
between active fund performance and portfolio concentration using monthly data.  Concentration 
is examined using the Divergence Index, which is estimated at the stock, industry and sector 
levels. A series of control variables are also specified in the regression framework in order to 
capture the impact of fund manager characteristics that are related to portfolio concentration.  
The model is estimated as an unbalanced pooling regression with panel corrected standard 
errors.11  
                                                 
11 The panel is unbalanced as most of the funds in the sample either do not exist over the entire sample period or 
whose data was only provided for a limited time period. 
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The regression is specified as: 
 
tititititititi ITIlLNGlTNATUDIePerformanc ,1,3,3,33,21,10, εββββ ++++++= −−−−−   (5) 
 
where: 
DI   = Divergence Index of fund i at time t-1; 
TU  = Average annual turnover of fund i at time t-3 (minimum of purchases and 
sales over the average TNA for the calendar year); 
lTNA  = Natural logarithm of the total net assets of fund i at time t-3; 
lLNG  = Natural logarithm of the length of time in which the manager of fund i at 
time t appears in the Mercer Investment Consulting Manager Performance 
Analytics (MPA) database, which is a proxy for a fund’s age; 
ITI  = Industry Turnover Index of fund i at time t; 
εit  = Random error term of fund i at time t. 
 
For those regressions performed at both the industry and sector level, the variable ITI in equation 
(6) captures the degree of manager activity in switching between industries/sectors.  ITI is 
measured as the sum of the squared deviations of the weights for each of the industries/sectors 
held by the funds relative to their portfolio holdings in the previous period. 
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The regression results examining portfolio performance and the relationship to portfolio 
concentration, as well as concentration and other manager characteristics, are presented in Table 
3.  The coefficients for each of the performance measures are documented in Panels A through D 
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at the stock, industry and sector levels.  Consistent with successful active managers exhibiting 
concentrated portfolios, the coefficient on the Divergence Index is both positive and highly 
significant for all regressions.  These results are also consistent with U.S. evidence for mutual 
funds. 
 
The positive and significant Divergence Index coefficients for the appraisal ratio regressions 
indicate that the performance-concentration relationship is not driven by an increase in 
idiosyncratic or diversifiable risk.  Our findings for the 4-factor alpha regressions also indicate 
that additional risk factors do not provide contradictory evidence from the results obtained when 
performance is measured using the single index model.  In addition, our findings are also robust 
to different measures of portfolio concentration (i.e. at the stock, industry and sector level).   
 
In order to determine the economic significance of the results, we examine the impact on 
portfolio performance of an increase in the Divergence Index (as determined by the size of the 
DI coefficients estimated in the above regressions).  The inter-quartile range for the Divergence 
Index distribution (stock level) is 66.5 points; which is a relevant change in concentration for the 
purposes of illustrating the economic significance of the performance/concentration relation.  We 
calculate the change in each of the performance measures following an increase of 66.5 points in 
the Divergence index. The annual excess return for the average fund increases by 2.84% 
(=66.5*0.00355*12), implying that in addition to being statistically significant, the results are 
also economically significant. Similarly, the one factor alpha increases by 0.15, the four factor 
alpha by 0.11 and the appraisal ratio by 0.07.  
 
The impact of a similar increase in concentration at the industry and sector levels does not 
translate into as great an improvement in fund performance, suggesting that abnormal 
performance is generated more so by bets made at the stock level.  Further evidence supporting 
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this intuition is the negative coefficient on the industry/sector turnover variable, suggesting that 
better performing funds switch between industries less frequently than poor performing funds. 
Therefore, performance appears to be derived from stock picking ability from within industries 
(i.e. at the stock level) rather than the ability of managers to identify particular industries.  This 
represents an interesting extension to the work of Kacperczyk et al. (2005). 
 
Portfolio turnover is inversely related to fund performance, such that superior performing funds 
experience lower trading as a percentage of fund assets, however, this variable is largely 
insignificant in a statistical sense across the Panels in Table 3.  Smaller funds are found to be the 
superior performers in our sample across all performance measures, as well as on the basis of all 
three concentration partitions (i.e. stock, industry and sector levels).  It is also evident that on 
average, older funds record higher performance than younger funds. 
 
<<INSERT TABLE 3>> 
 
  
D. Over- and Under-Weighting Decisions  
 
The above examination of the relationship between fund performance and concentration at an 
aggregate level demonstrates an important relationship exists between these variables.  However, 
consideration of the direction of the bet taken (in addition to magnitude) may lead to important 
insights in terms of portfolio design and fund performance.  Therefore, partitioning the portfolio 
holdings according to overweights and underweights (relative to the benchmark) is also 
examined, and these results are presented in Table 4.  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 4>> 
 
 
As discussed earlier, an active fund manager with a negative outlook for a security is likely to 
exclude that stock entirely from their portfolio, rather than underweight the security relative to 
the benchmark weight.  Stocks held in the portfolio as underweight exposures likely reflect (1) a 
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change in manager sentiment, leading to the liquidation of the stock over time, (2) the manager 
progressively acquiring the stock, or (3) the portfolio owning the stock for tracking error 
considerations.  If active managers select stocks on the basis of private information and if stocks 
are generally owned where a long-only active manager expects the stock to outperform, then the 
portfolio performance and concentration relationship is likely to be asymmetric (given that stock 
picking talent is principally determined as an overweight decision).   
 
The results in Table 4 report the panel regression estimates for both overweight and underweight 
portfolio holdings.  In terms of the overweight partition, our results are more significant, both 
statistically and economically.  This is consistent with fund managers deriving superior 
performance by taking bets on stocks they expect to outperform, and overweighting these in the 
fund.  All concentration coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, and 
robust to all measures of performance.  Moreover, the coefficients are of larger magnitudes than 
for the aggregate sample (i.e. Table 3).  In comparison, for the underweight partition, the 
estimate on the concentration variable is insignificant across all Panels of Table 4.  However, 
these results are not conclusive, as the analysis in Table 2 shows the average number of 
underweight positions is significantly lower than the number of overweight positions and thus 
the Divergence Index calculated for the former may not be as reliable.  Furthermore, the lower 
adjusted R2 for each of the underweight models points to the power of the test being weaker. 
  
In order to assess the economic significance of these results, and to compare them against the 
aggregate sample, we examine the implications for performance following a change in the 
Divergence Index.  Increasing the Divergence Index by 66.5 (which is the size of the inter-
quartile range of the stock divergence indexes for the aggregate sample) results in the annual 
excess return for the fund increasing by 3.00% (compared to 2.84% for the aggregate sample).  
This demonstrates that the performance/concentration relationship is stronger for stocks in which 
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the manager is overweight.  Similarly, the one factor alpha increases by 0.164, the four factor 
alpha by 0.132 and the appraisal ratio by 0.091, compared to 0.148, 0.108 and 0.067 for the 
aggregate sample. 
 
 
E. Stock Size – Top 50 and Ex-Top 50 
Given that active decisions relating to portfolio holdings expose the portfolio to tracking error 
risk, an individual stock’s contribution to portfolio tracking error volatility should be considered 
in light of how an active fund manager executes active bets.  The contribution to tracking error is 
a function of stock size (or the benchmark index); therefore, small firms may be included in a 
portfolio for different reasons than large firms.  Large stocks cannot be significantly under/over 
weighted relative to the Index, since even small price movements for large stocks can generate 
significant over/under performance.  In addition, risk compliance practices adopted by 
investment management institutions seek to constrain the magnitude of the over-and-under 
weights positions held by their portfolios, particularly in the largest stocks.  However, lower 
tracking error contribution stocks can be more easily removed, or larger bets taken in such 
securities (subject to liquidity), given they exhibit lower relative tracking error risk.  This issue is 
of particular relevance in the Australian market given the concentrated nature of the ASX.  As 
detailed in Appendix 2, the largest 10 stocks comprise more than 47% of the aggregate weight of 
the S&P/ASX 300. 
 
In light of the fact that tracking error is directly related to the stock size of index constituents, 
small stocks are more likely to be included for private information reasons, whereas large stocks 
should be included and well represented in an active manager’s portfolio for both information 
and non-information reasons.  We hypothesize that the performance/concentration relationship is 
likely to be better explained according to smaller stock positions.  Smaller stock holdings also 
help to ensure greater divergence in holdings across fund managers on the basis of information 
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value, as well as fund managers not facing the same constraints on the portfolio’s relative 
exposure to these stocks.  We investigate this by partitioning the sample on the basis of stock 
size, where regressions are performed for manager’s holdings in the largest 50 stocks (Top 50) 
(ranked by market capitalisation) and ex-top 50 stocks.  The results are presented in Table 5.   
 
<<INSERT TABLE 5>> 
 
 
Consistent with our hypothesis, the performance/concentration relation is stronger for smaller 
stocks, and the coefficients for the ex-top 50 sample are economically and statistically 
significant.  For all performance measures (with the exception of 1 factor alpha), the 
concentration coefficient for the top 50 regressions is indistinguishable from zero. Thus, active 
managers appear to derive less informational value from large stocks, and this result is also 
consistent with the findings relating to trading performance by Gallagher and Looi (2005).   
 
Commonality in large-cap holdings is also more likely to arise across the manager universe, and 
therefore cross-sectional variation is likely to be smaller compared to ex-top 50 securities.  In 
terms of tracking error and portfolio optimization, we also acknowledge that large stocks have a 
more important influence on overall fund tracking error, and therefore the deviations away from 
benchmark weight may be limited by managers.  Concentration coefficients for ex-top 50 stocks 
are all positive and significant at the 1% level and larger than coefficients for top 50 stocks, 
indicating that concentration in small securities is contributing more to fund performance than 
larger securities.  In Appendix 3 we also report performance and concentration results for the 
largest twenty stocks, stocks ranked 21-100 by market capitalisation, and the remaining portfolio 
securities, and report consistent evidence to our findings in Table 5 about the importance of 
small-cap bets to fund performance. 
 
 
V. Portfolio Concentration and Fund Manager Characteristics 
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The existence of a significant and positive relationship between performance and portfolio 
concentration leads to questions of whether the degree of concentration can be explained with 
respect to investment manager characteristics.  This section examines the determinants of 
concentration by employing a multivariate regression framework to examine the relationship 
between the Divergence Index and a series of both qualitative and quantitative fund 
characteristic variables.  The model is estimated as an unbalanced pooling regression with panel 
corrected standard errors. 
 
The regression model is estimated as:  
titititij
j
jtitititi BADBMDBUDSDFFTUlTNADI ,,6,54,,
3
1
3,33,23,10, εββββ ++++++++= ∑
=
−−−   (7) 
Where: 
DI   =  Divergence Index of fund i at time t; 
lTNA   = Natural logarithm of the total net assets of fund i at time t-3; 
TU = Average annual turnover of fund i at time t-3 (minimum of purchases and 
sales over the average TNA for the calendar year); 
FF = Annual net fund flow for previous 12 months of fund i at time t measured 
by: 
12,,12,,, /)]1(*[ −− +−= tititititi ASSETSRASSETSASSETSNETFLOW  
where: 
Assetsi,t  =    Size of fund i at time t  
Assetsi,t-1 =    Size of fund i at time t-12; and 
Ri,t =    Return of fund i from time t-12 to time t. 
 Sj =   A series of three dummy variables reflecting the investment style, S1 = 1 for 
value funds, S2 = 1 for growth funds and S3 = 1 for GARP (growth at a 
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reasonable price) funds, the fourth style classification is style neutral/other 
funds; 
BU = A dummy variable which is 1 for bottom-up funds and 0 for top-down 
funds; 
BM = A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the fund is benchmarked to the 
S&P/ASX 300 and 0 otherwise; 
BA = A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the fund is bank or life office 
affiliated and zero otherwise; 
εit  = Error term of fund i at time t. 
 
The inclusion of a variable relating to the size of the fund reflects the assumption that larger 
funds are more susceptible to restrictions, whereby limitations arise with respect to a fund’s 
capacity to hold significantly concentrated portfolios.  This is particularly important for larger 
fund managers, as well as in cases involving smaller and less liquid stocks.12  Secondly, larger 
investment organizations are more likely to be subject to prudent man-type investment 
constraints that may limit the degree to which large bets are taken, and therefore the extent of 
concentration in a portfolio.  Table 6 shows that smaller funds exhibit a higher degree of 
concentration, witnessed in the negative and significant size coefficient. 
 
Table 6 also reveals that more concentrated funds turn over their portfolios more frequently, 
which is consistent with the U.S. evidence (see Kacperczyk et al. (2005)). The direction of the 
net fund flow coefficients indicates that funds are more concentrated following negative fund 
flows.  This may be a result of firstly, managers reinvesting any new money into securities not 
already owned and secondly, in the case of outflows, managers selling down specific holdings 
rather than relatively small liquidations across a large number of holdings.  The results suggest 
                                                 
12 Golec (1996) finds that as U.S. mutual fund managers become larger they typically invest in larger companies. 
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that market manipulation, where managers induce positive price pressure on stocks already 
owned, does not occur.  
 
The investment style of an institution may also be related to fund concentration. Dummy 
variables are included to examine this effect.  The Portfolio Analytics Database includes 
information relating to the self-stated investment style of the fund. Of the 37 managers examined 
in this study, 10 are value managers, 11 are GARP managers, five are growth managers and 11 
are managers employing other styles, including style neutral.  The results presented in Table 6 
show that value and GARP fund managers exhibit significantly lower concentration, whereas 
growth funds have significantly more concentrated portfolios. 
 
The regression results in Table 6 include a variable that specifies whether the investment 
manager emphasizes a “top-down” or “bottom-up” approach in determining the composition of 
the portfolio.  In other words, bottom-up managers emphasize individual stock picking, whereas 
top-down managers first determine sector bets, and then allocate funds to individual stocks to 
achieve the desired weight allocations.  While the results indicate that a bottom-up approach 
leads to portfolios which are more heavily concentrated, the coefficient is statistically 
insignificant.  A variable relating to the index against which the fund is benchmarked is also 
included.  While there is very little difference between the market capitalisation coverage (and 
stock weights) for the S&P/ASX 200 and 300 indices, our results indicate that funds 
benchmarked to the S&P/ASX 300 are less concentrated than funds benchmarked to narrower 
indices.  This may be motivated by concern for tracking error risk.  In order to minimize tracking 
error risk it is likely that a portfolio benchmarked to the S&P/ASX300 will contain more stocks 
than those benchmarked to the S&P/ASX200 or S&P/ASX100. 
 
<<INSERT TABLE 6>> 
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We also examine the institutional structure of the firm to determine whether differences in 
organisation, incentives, and marketing or distribution platforms explain portfolio concentration. 
The analysis is also motivated given the findings of Del Guercio (1996) where bank fund 
managers tend to be influenced by prudent-man type constraints more than mutual fund 
managers.  This would be expected to minimize the size of the bets taken by these managers, and 
therefore portfolios would be expected to be more broadly diversified.  Our results show that 
bank and life office affiliated managers hold significantly less concentrated portfolios than other 
fund managers (e.g. boutiques). 
 
 
VI. Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
This study examines the relationship between fund performance and portfolio concentration for a 
sample of active Australian equity managers.  Our study evaluates concentration by assessing 
how the portfolio’s weights across stocks, industries and sectors deviate from the underlying 
benchmark index. The research represents an important contribution to the literature by 
empirically examining how portfolio construction impacts on an active manager’s ability to earn 
returns in excess of the market.  We document a positive relationship between fund performance 
and portfolio concentration at the stock, industry and sector levels, which is consistent with 
successful active managers holding portfolios exhibiting higher concentration.  The 
performance/concentration relationship is also significant (insignificant) for stocks in which 
managers hold overweight (underweight) positions.  
 
A partition on the basis of stock size was performed in light of active fund managers’ portfolio 
risk control considerations (i.e. tracking error).  Given that tracking error is related to the size of 
stocks in the Index, small stocks are more likely to be included for private information reasons, 
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whereas large stocks are expected be included more as a means of constraining tracking error 
(i.e. diversification reasons).  Consistent with this hypothesis, the performance/concentration 
relationship is stronger for stocks in which active managers hold both overweight positions, and 
for stocks outside the S&P/ASX 50 (i.e. smaller stocks in terms of market capitalisation).  The 
relationship between portfolio concentration and a series of qualitative and quantitative fund 
characteristic variables is also examined as a means of identifying the determinants of portfolio 
bets executed by active management institutions.  Concentrated funds with higher portfolio 
concentration are those with smaller assets under management, who have experienced fund 
outflows in the previous quarter, implement a growth investment style, are not affiliated with a 
bank or life-office institutions, as well as their funds being benchmarked to a narrower index 
than the S&P/ASX 300. 
 
Portfolio concentration may also be examined in terms of the deviations of the portfolio relative 
to the risk attributes of the market portfolio.  This is motivated by the observation that managers 
typically construct portfolios with respect to a mean-variance framework (where portfolio 
optimisation techniques seek to constrain the fund’s tracking error volatility).  The active ‘bets’ 
taken across stocks and sectors represent one empirical test of concentration, and an examination 
that also examines differences in holdings with respect to mean-variance and optimisation is also 
likely to be important.  Future research should examine the relationship between portfolio 
concentration and investment manager performance with respect to portfolio optimisation 
techniques that are implemented by active managers in portfolio construction.  Modern Portfolio 
Theory shows that investors achieve optimal portfolios which are mean-variance efficient.  
Indeed, institutional fund managers are highly sophisticated in their use of quantitative risk 
models in portfolio construction, and various commercial software packages (e.g. BARRA) 
provide managers with tools to perform portfolio optimisation outcomes that seek to constrain 
the fund’s tracking error volatility. Return covariances and variances are key inputs to these 
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optimisation techniques and can be incorporated into our determination of portfolio 
concentration with respect specific risk factors. Moskowitz (2003) documents the relationship of 
size and book-to-market value of equity to portfolio covariance risk and Chan, Karceski and 
Lakonishok (1999) find evidence that market, size and book-to-market value of equity capture 
the general structure of these return covariances. Hence, portfolio optimisation techniques 
represent other important dimensions in portfolio design, and are offered as suggestions for 
future research. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics  
This table presents descriptive statistics for the actively managed institutional equity funds in the Portfolio Analytics 
Database between January 1995 and September 2001. Number of Funds refers to the number of funds as at 31 
December of each year. Length measures the number of years each of the funds is present in the sample, and is a 
proxy for fund age. TNA refers to the total net assets under management for each fund as at the end of the month.  
Turnover is the average annual turnover and is defined as the minimum of purchases and sales over the average 
TNA for the calendar year. Return is defined as the monthly raw return of the fund. 
 
 Mean Median 
Number of Funds 22.88 22.51 
Length  (Years) 4.60 4.75 
TNA (Millions) 313.51 149.13 
Turnover (%) 76.74 70.11 
Return (%) 1.02 1.13 
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Table 2 
Portfolio Composition  
Panel A reports descriptive statistics relating the number of stocks held by active managers in the period January 
1995 to December 2001. Similar descriptive statistics are also reported for the average number of times over 
benchmark weight for overweight (OW) and underweight (UW) positions in Panels B and C. Times Index Weight 
(OW) is measured by the stock’s weight in the portfolio divided by the index weight for that stock, and is 
determined for all stocks held by the manager for which the stock’s weight in the portfolio is greater than the index 
weight.  Times Index Weight (UW) is measured as the ratio of a stock’s index weight in the benchmark, divided by 
the portfolio’s weight held in the stock.  In other words, OW and UW ratios are measured differently to one another 
as a means of ensuring consistency with the definition “times”. Summary statistics for the Average Number of OW 
and UW Positions are also reported in Panels D and E.  
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Panel A (Number of Stocks)        
Mean 59.58 52.93 54.16 56.62 58.97 60.11 58.83 
Median 49.50 43.00 45.00 50.5 54.00 54.00 54.00 
Minimum 18.00 28.00 19.00 22.00 18.00 28.00 28.00 
Maximum 140.00 155.00 122.00 128.00 122.00 143.00 155.00 
Standard Deviation 37.55 24.59 29.18 29.67 27.01 29.77 26.83 
        
Panel B ( Times Index Weight (OW)) 
Mean 7.03 5.95 5.18 5.00 4.73 5.24 4.52 
Median 6.32 5.16 5.16 3.92 3.77 4.41 3.66 
Minimum 1.89 2.09 2.10 1.84 1.88 1.97 1.91 
Maximum 15.63 11.78 11.28 19.85 22.57 22.02 13.39 
Standard Deviation 4.37 3.39 2.68 3.58 3.76 3.65 2.62 
        
Panel C (Times Index Weight (UW)) 
Mean 1.69 1.74 1.81 1.76 1.69 1.66 1.74 
Median 1.54 1.47 1.52 1.61 1.59 1.52 1.62 
Minimum 1.06 1.28 1.12 1.18 1.16 1.09 1.20 
Maximum 3.42 3.26 3.58 3.00 3.16 2.88 3.03 
Standard Deviation 0.61 0.59 0.73 0.47 0.50 0.41 0.43 
        
Panel D (Average Number of OW Positions) 
Mean 41.69 39.81 37.76 37.71 37.05 39.38 39.67 
Median 37.5 34.16 33.58 32.25 32.71 32.33 34.5 
Minimum 12.80 18.91 16.58 18.66 19.41 20.50 22.50 
Maximum 89.25 72.66 82.00 82.45 72.33 87.66 77.81 
Standard Deviation 20.72 16.38 16.88 17.16 14.14 16.68 15.87 
        
Panel E (Average Number of UW Positions) 
Mean 8.23 8.39 7.25 9.73 9.70 9.17 11.05 
Median 3.12 6.90 4.25 7.50 7.25 6.27 8.29 
Minimum 1.000 1.42 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.36 
Maximum 50.00 25.75 22.00 33.75 32.33 36.08 40.41 
Standard Deviation 13.65 6.74 5.98 8.33 7.59 7.73 8.63 
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Table 3 
Regression Evidence: Concentration and Fund Performance  
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the monthly panel regression for the following model: 
tititititititi ITIlLNGlTNATUDIePerformanc ,1,3,3,33,21,10, εββββ ++++++= −−−−− . The data consists of the 
holdings of 37 actively managed institutional equity funds between January 1995 and December 2001. Performance 
measures include fund excess returns (raw return – benchmark return), 1 factor alpha, 4 factor alpha and the 
appraisal ratio the results for which are seen in Panels A through D.  The Divergence Index of fund i at time t is sum 
of the squared differences of the weights for N securities in the portfolio (wi,tF), relative to the weights of the 
securities in the underlying benchmark (wi,tm). Turnover is the average annual turnover of fund i at time t-3 
(minimum of purchases and sales over the average TNA for the calendar year). Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of 
the total net assets of fund i at time t-3. Log(Length) is the natural logarithm of the length of time in which the 
manager of fund i at time t appears in the Mercer Investment Consulting Manager Performance Analytics (MPA) 
database (i.e. a proxy for fund age). Industry/Sector Turnover is the sum of the squared deviations of the weights for 
each of the industries/sectors held by the funds relative to their holdings in the previous period. The model is 
estimated as an unbalanced pooling regression with panel corrected standard errors. N. Obs is the number of 
observations.
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Intercept 0.799 1.19 2.143 3.10 *** 1.742 2.60 ***
Divergence Index 0.004 3.53 *** 0.001 2.60 *** 0.001 2.64 ***
Turnover -0.001 -1.21 -0.001 -1.62 -0.001 -1.66
Log(TNA) -0.052 -1.35 -0.115 -2.91 *** -0.095 -2.45 **
Log(Length) 0.085 1.09 0.154 2.10 ** 0.135 1.79
Industry/Sector Turnover na na -0.002 -1.82 0.000 -0.50
Adj. R2 1.720 1.610 1.520
Wald Chi2 20.570 *** 14.370 13.060
N Obs 1199 1190 1183
Intercept 0.380 2.98 *** 1.084 9.36 *** 0.951 9.61 ***
Divergence Index 0.002 8.67 *** 0.000 2.75 *** 0.001 3.43 ***
Turnover 0.000 -0.95 0.000 -1.79 0.000 -1.08
Log(TNA) -0.013 -2.01 ** -0.043 -7.08 *** -0.038 -7.28 ***
Log(Length) -0.008 -0.58 0.023 1.76 0.023 1.68
Industry/Sector Turnover na na -0.001 -3.15 *** -0.001 -2.68 ***
Adj. R2 9.040 4.360 4.690
Wald Chi2 217.930 *** 61.390 *** 81.390 ***
N Obs 1258 1249 1241
Intercept 0.663 4.74 *** 1.116 8.99 *** 1.043 9.46 ***
Divergence Index 0.002 6.12 *** 0.000 2.28 ** 0.000 2.35 **
Turnover 0.000 -1.13 0.000 -1.70 0.000 -1.69
Log(TNA) -0.030 -3.89 *** -0.048 -6.73 *** -0.044 -6.92 ***
Log(Length) 0.022 1.37 0.041 2.88 *** 0.037 2.50 **
Industry/Sector Turnover na na -0.001 -1.56 0.000 -2.25 **
Adj. R2 5.610 3.280 3.470
Wald Chi2 103.300 *** 51.410 *** 53.590 ***
N Obs 1255 1246 1238
Intercept 1.656 7.13 *** 2.091 9.17 *** 1.939 9.21 ***
Divergence Index 0.001 2.94 *** 0.000 2.02 ** 0.000 2.80 ***
Turnover -0.001 -2.06 ** 0.000 -1.53 -0.001 -1.62
Log(TNA) -0.075 -6.15 *** -0.094 -7.45 *** -0.087 -7.50 ***
Log(Length) 0.040 1.61 0.059 2.34 ** 0.054 2.15 **
Industry/Sector Turnover na na -0.002 -3.36 *** -0.001 -3.09 ***
Adj. R2 5.200 5.670 5.570
Wald Chi2 70.160 *** 62.390 *** 63.260 ***
N Obs 1218 1198 1191
Panel B  (1 Factor Alpha)
Panel C (4 Factor Alpha)
Panel D ( Appraisal Ratio)
Stock Industry Sector
Panel A (Excess Returns)
***, ** indicates statistical significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively 
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Table 4  
Regression Evidence for Concentration and Fund Performance: Overweight and 
Underweight Positions 
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the monthly panel regression for the following model: 
titititititi lLNGlTNATUDIePerformanc ,3,3,33,21,10, εββββ +++++= −−−− . The data consists of the holdings 
of 37 actively managed institutional equity funds between January 1995 and December 2001. Performance measures 
include fund excess returns (raw return – benchmark return), 1 factor alpha, 4 factor alpha and the appraisal ratio the 
results for which are seen in Panels A through D.  The Divergence Index of fund i at time t is sum of the squared 
differences of the weights for N securities in the portfolio (wi,tF), relative to the weights of the securities in the 
underlying benchmark (wi,tm). Turnover is the average annual turnover of fund i at time t-3 (minimum of purchases 
and sales over the average TNA for the calendar year). Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of the total net assets of 
fund i at time t-3. Log(Length) is the natural logarithm of the length of time in which the manager of fund i at time t 
appears in the Mercer Investment Consulting Manager Performance Analytics (MPA) database (i.e. a proxy for fund 
age). Industry/Sector Turnover is the sum of the squared deviations of the weights for each of the industries/sectors 
held by the funds relative to their holdings in the previous period. The model is estimated as an unbalanced pooling 
regression with panel corrected standard errors. N Obs is the number of observations. 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Panel A ( Excess Returns)
Intercept 0.6887 1.02 1.6361 2.45 **
Concentration (DI) 0.0038 4.25 *** 0.005 0.49
Turnover -0.0006 -0.78 -0.0012 -1.54
lnTNA -0.0464 -1.21 -0.0828 -2.20 **
lnLength 0.0831 1.07 0.1153 1.52
Adj. R2 2.33 0.63
Wald Chi2 33.43 *** 6.53
N Obs 1210 1155
Panel B  (1 Factor Alpha)
Intercept 0.3035 2.38 ** 0.8409 6.70 ***
Concentration (DI) 0.0025 9.25 *** 0.0006 0.26
Turnover -0.0001 -0.69 -0.0003 -1.23
lnTNA -0.0092 -1.45 -0.0282 -3.84 ***
lnLength -0.0105 -0.74 0.0041 0.27
Adj. R2 10.37 1.5
Wald Chi2 257.16 *** 21.99 ***
N Obs 1262 1211
Panel C (4 Factor Alpha)
Intercept 0.5678 4.15 *** 1.0041 8.94 ***
Concentration (DI) 0.002 7.44 *** 0.0035 1.59
Turnover -0.0002 -0.94 -0.0003 -1.37
lnTNA -0.0253 -3.43 *** -0.0412 -6.17 ***
lnLength 0.0172 1.10 0.0223 1.46
Adj. R2 7.04 2.28
Wald Chi2 125.48 *** 43.54 ***
N Obs 1259 1208
Panel D (Appraisal Ratio)
Intercept 1.5518 6.72 *** 1.8002 7.90 ***
Concentration (DI) 0.0014 3.95 *** -0.0034 -0.90
Turnover -0.0005 -1.90 -0.0003 -1.04
lnTNA -0.0705 -5.84 *** -0.0765 -6.24 ***
lnLength 0.0352 1.44 0.0151 0.62
Adj. R2 5.68 4.26
Wald Chi2 80.45 *** 42.61 ***
N Obs 1222 1105
Overweight Underweight
 
***, ** indicates statistical significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively 
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Table 5  
Regression Evidence for Concentration and Fund Performance: Top 50 Stocks and Ex-
Top 50 Stocks  
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the monthly panel regression for the following model: 
titititititi lLNGlTNATUDIePerformanc ,3,3,33,21,10, εββββ +++++= −−−− . The data consists of the holdings 
of 37 actively managed institutional equity funds between January 1995 and December 2001. Performance measures 
include fund excess returns (raw return – benchmark return), 1 factor alpha, 4 factor alpha and the appraisal ratio the 
results for which are seen in Panels A through D.  The Divergence Index of fund i at time t is sum of the squared 
differences of the weights for N securities in the portfolio (wi,tF), relative to the weights of the securities in the 
underlying benchmark (wi,tm). Turnover is the average annual turnover of fund i at time t-3 (minimum of purchases 
and sales over the average TNA for the calendar year). Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of the total net assets of 
fund i at time t-3. Log(Length) is the natural logarithm of the length of time in which the manager of fund i at time t 
appears in the Mercer Investment Consulting Manager Performance Analytics (MPA) database (i.e. a proxy for fund 
age). Industry/Sector Turnover is the sum of the squared deviations of the weights for each of the industries/sectors 
held by the funds relative to their holdings in the previous period. The model is estimated as an unbalanced pooling 
regression with panel corrected standard errors. N Obs is the number of observations. 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Intercept 1.404 2.10 ** 0.722 1.08
Concentration (DI) 0.002 1.23 0.007 3.05 ***
Turnover -0.001 -1.29 -0.001 -1.52
lnTNA -0.074 -1.93 -0.048 -1.26
lnLength 0.100 1.28 0.157 2.19 **
Adj. R2 0.740 1.740
Wald Chi2 7.250 21.020 ***
N Obs 1203 1202
Intercept 0.671 6.02 *** 0.251 1.71
Concentration (DI) 0.002 5.65 *** 0.005 7.70 ***
Turnover 0.000 -0.95 0.000 -1.53
lnTNA -0.023 -3.84 *** -0.008 -1.10
lnLength -0.013 -0.84 0.039 3.37 ***
Adj. R2 4.360 11.460
Wald Chi2 93.340 *** 153.840 ***
N Obs 1262 1261
Intercept 1.142 6.94 *** 0.501 3.51 ***
Concentration (DI) 0.000 0.30 0.004 6.47 ***
Turnover -0.001 -2.93 *** 0.000 -1.64
lnTNA -0.045 -4.82 *** -0.023 -3.12 ***
lnLength 0.033 1.87 0.058 4.18 ***
Adj. R2 3.060 8.180
Wald Chi2 34.690 *** 101.690 ***
N Obs 1228 1258
Intercept 1.826 8.30 *** 1.406 5.71 ***
Concentration (DI) 0.001 1.06 0.004 4.57 ***
Turnover -0.001 -2.12 ** -0.001 -2.39 **
lnTNA -0.081 -6.84 *** -0.065 -5.16 ***
lnLength 0.042 1.79 0.067 2.67 ***
Adj. R2 4.620 6.840
Wald Chi2 56.470 *** 83.070 ***
N Obs 1222 1221
Panel C ( 4 Factor Alpha)
Panel D (Appraisal Ratio)
Top 50 Ex-Top 50
Panel A ( Excess Returns)
Panel B ( 1 Factor Alpha)
 
***, ** indicates statistical significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively 
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Table 6 
Regression Evidence for Concentration and Fund Characteristics  
 
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the monthly panel regression for the following model:  
titititij
j
jtitititi BADBMDBUDSDFFTUlTNADI ,,6,54,,
3
1
3,33,23,10, εββββ ++++++++= ∑
=
−−−  
The data consists of the holdings of 37 actively managed institutional equity funds between January 1995 and 
December 2001. The Divergence Index (DI) of fund i at time t is measured as ∑
=
−=
N
i
M
ti
F
ti
F
t wwDI
1
2
,, )(
, where wi,tF 
is the weight of the fund holdings in stock i and  wi,tm is the weight of the market in stock i. (TNA) is the natural 
logarithm of the total net assets of fund i at time t-3. Turnover is the average annual turnover of fund i at time t-3 
(minimum of purchases and sales over the average TNA for the calendar year). Fund Flow is the annual net fund 
flow for the previous 12 months of fund i at time t. Sj are a series of 3 dummy variables reflecting the investment 
style, S1 = 1 for value funds, S2 = 1 for growth funds and S3 = 1 for GARP (growth at a reasonable price) funds, the 
fourth style classification is style neutral/other funds. BU is a dummy variable which is 1 for bottom-up funds and 0 
for top-down funds, BM is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the fund is benchmarked to the S&P/ASX 300 and 
0 otherwise and BA is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the fund is bank or life office affiliated and zero 
otherwise. The model is estimated as an unbalanced pooling regression with panel corrected standard errors. N. Obs 
is the number of observations. 
 
Dependent Variables Coefficient t-stat  
Intercept 239.06 15.51 *** 
Log(TNA) -14.31 -7.13 *** 
Turnover 0.02 2.07 ** 
Fund Flow 0.00 -2.83 *** 
S1 -10.31 -2.80 *** 
S2 20.45 6.35 *** 
S3 -19.57 -8.46 *** 
Bottom Up 4.33 1.53  
Benchmark -12.05 -7.17 *** 
Bank/Life Office -42.51 -15.91 *** 
    
Adj. R2 23.29   
Wald Chi2 2307.77***   
N. Obs 1770  
***, ** indicates statistical significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively 
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Figure 1  
Histograms of Divergence Index 
 
This figure illustrates the distribution of the Divergence Index determined at the stock, industry and sector levels. 
The Divergence Index is defined as ∑
=
−=
N
i
M
ti
F
ti
F
t wwDI
1
2
,, )( , where wi,tF is the weight of the fund holdings in 
stock/industry/sector i and  wi,tm is the weight of the market in stock/industry/sector i. 
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Appendix 1 
Industry and Sector Classifications 
Securities are classified into 1 of 24 industries and 1 of 9 sectors. The 24 industries are based on the ASX industry 
classification system that was in effect at the time in which the analysis is conducted. The 24 industries are further 
subdivided as appears in the 9 sector classification on the basis of the GICS (Global Industry Classification) system. 
Weights of each industry and sector are reported according to their average representation in the S&P/ASX 300 over 
the period January 1995 - December 2001. 
9 Sector Classification Weight (%) 24 Industry ASX Classification Weight (%) 
Energy 2.957 Energy 2.957 
Materials 18.188 Gold 2.798 
  Other Metals 5.251 
  Diversified Resources 7.854 
  Chemicals 0.794 
  Paper and Packaging 1.489 
Industrials 10.8974 Developers and Contractors 2.888 
  Building and Materials 3.115 
  Engineering 0.4792 
  Transport 2.794 
  Miscellaneous Industrials 1.457 
  Diversified Industrials 0.1616 
Consumer Discretionary 11.177 Retail 1.489 
  Media 7.758 
  Tourism and Leisure 1.929 
Consumer Staples 5.715 Alcohol and Tobacco 2.791 
  Food and Household 2.923 
Healthcare 1.905 Healthcare and Biotechnology 1.905 
Financials 32.145 Banks and Finance 19.48 
  Insurance 3.828 
  Investments and Financial Services 1.810 
  Property Trusts 7.024 
Telecommunication 
Services 4.753 Telecommunication 4.753 
Utilities 4.246 Infrastructure and Utilities 4.246 
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Appendix 2 
Concentration of S&P/ASX 300 
 
This table illustrates the concentration evident in the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) by reporting the relative 
weights in the S&P/ASX 300 of varying sub-set of stocks on the basis of their market capitalisation as at 31 March 
2002. The S&P/AXS 300 is a value-weighted index comprising 300 stocks.  
 
 
 Weight in S&P/ASX 300 (%) 
Top 5 29.76 
Top 10  47.69 
Top 20  62.25 
Top 50 82.42 
Top 100 93.22 
Bottom 200 6.78 
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Appendix 3 
Regression Evidence for Concentration and Fund Performance: Top 20 Stocks, 21-100 
Stocks and 100+ Stocks 
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the monthly panel regression for the following 
model: titititititi lLNGlTNATUDIePerformanc ,3,3,33,21,10, εββββ +++++= −−−− . The data consists of the 
holdings of 37 actively managed institutional equity funds between January 1995 and December 2001. Performance 
measures include fund excess returns (raw return – benchmark return), 1 factor alpha, 4 factor alpha and the 
appraisal ratio the results for which are seen in Panels A through D.  The Divergence Index of fund i at time t is sum 
of the squared differences of the weights for N securities in the portfolio (wi,tF), relative to the weights of the 
securities in the underlying benchmark (wi,tm). Turnover is the average annual turnover of fund i at time t-3 
(minimum of purchases and sales over the average TNA for the calendar year). Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of 
the total net assets of fund i at time t-3. Log(Length) is the natural logarithm of the length of time in which the 
manager of fund i at time t appears in the Mercer Investment Consulting Manager Performance Analytics (MPA) 
database (i.e. a proxy for fund age). The model is estimated as an unbalanced pooling regression with panel 
corrected standard errors. N Obs is the number of observations. 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Intercept 1.493 2.24 ** 1.219 1.78 0.967 1.52
Divergence Index 0.000 -0.01 0.004 1.68 0.011 2.81 ***
Turnover -0.001 -1.39 -0.001 -1.34 -0.001 -1.52
Log(TNA) -0.075 -1.98 ** -0.067 -1.72 -0.061 -1.64
Log(Length) 0.114 1.49 0.103 1.27 0.173 2.37 **
Adj. R2 0.560 0.910 1.620
Wald Chi2 5.360 11.420 ** 15.810 ***
N Obs 1175 1203 1199
Intercept 0.810 6.62 *** 0.515 4.64 *** 0.355 2.29 **
Divergence Index 0.001 1.39 0.004 8.09 *** 0.009 8.05 ***
Turnover 0.000 -1.13 0.000 -1.15 0.000 -1.70
Log(TNA) -0.029 -4.26 *** -0.017 -2.93 *** -0.013 -1.67
Log(Length) 0.007 0.48 -0.005 -0.37 0.046 3.69 ***
Adj. R2 1.860 6.130 11.620
Wald Chi2 34.930 *** 192.770 *** 140.220 ***
N Obs 1234 1262 1258
Intercept 1.002 7.89 *** 0.737 5.84 *** 0.587 4.30 ***
Divergence Index 0.000 -0.34 0.003 5.41 *** 0.008 6.81 ***
Turnover 0.000 -1.28 0.000 -1.29 0.000 -1.73
Log(TNA) -0.042 -5.89 *** -0.032 -4.49 *** -0.028 -3.90 ***
Log(Length) 0.036 2.35 ** 0.021 1.31 0.065 4.46 ***
Adj. R2 2.330 4.750 8.470
Wald Chi2 38.760 *** 79.190 *** 111.860 ***
N Obs 1231 1259 1255
Intercept 1.990 8.87 *** 1.575 6.45 *** 1.442 5.69 ***
Divergence Index -0.002 -2.52 ** 0.002 3.46 *** 0.006 4.46 ***
Turnover -0.001 -2.30 ** 0.000 -1.00 -0.001 -1.20
Log(TNA) -0.087 -7.19 *** -0.070 -5.19 *** -0.066 -4.85 ***
Log(Length) 0.064 2.75 *** 0.023 0.70 0.060 1.77
Adj. R2 5.180 5.250 6.570
Wald Chi2 54.730 *** 60.480 *** 70.660 ***
N Obs 1194 1166 1162
Panel B  (1 Factor Alpha)
Panel C (4 Factor Alpha)
Panel D ( Appraisal Ratio)
Top 20 21 to 100 101 Plus
Panel A (Excess Returns)
***, ** indicates statistical significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively 
